promotion and recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples will be instrumental in pressuring national authorities to take necessary measures to protect TK, especially when such actions entail the conclusion of binding treaties.
¶7
As TK is created, applied, and preserved by local and indigenous communities, its protection used to be a national or local matter and concern. Nonetheless, there are significant reasons for the international community to pay due regard to TK protection as well, and there is a growing global movement to promote the international status of indigenous peoples, who possess most TK. For one, given its intrinsic value, the protection and preservation of TK benefits humankind as a whole, and should accordingly be of interest to the international community. In particular, because TK access and utilization has been exercised in boundary-crossing ways, the theft of TK has been and should continue to be strongly intolerant to international society. Misappropriation of TK has led to the granting of undesirable patents on inventions based directly on TK related to local bio-diversity, resulting in a form of TK piracy.
¶8
To date, the international community has responded to the issue of TK by formulating a variety of documents with differential legal implications. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 13 appears to be the first international agreement that obliges State parties to protect bio-related TK. The CBD has mandated the use of TK to comply with access and benefitsharing devices. After intense debate and study, the WIPO, based on a defensive approach, has drafted an unprecedented instrument exclusively for the protection of TK. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been negotiating the relationship between its intellectual property agreement, namely the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 14 and the CBD, in which a proposal to revise patent disclosure so as to add certain CBD mandates has aroused heated debate. 15 Following decades of effort, the General Assembly of the United Nations has finally adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 16 in which 11 Drahos, supra note 3, at 393-94. 12 TK has been misappropriated occasionally without just cause, either through failure to gain the approval of the holders of such knowledge, or failure to share any benefits with the holders. A number of infamous bio-piracy cases not only refer to misappropriation of national genetic resources but also associated TK. For an illustration of piracy on TK, see generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 65-67 (2000) (outlining patents on turmeric, neem and quinoa that were erroneously granted). 13 The Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 17 ¶9 This article aims to explore how these key global legal systems engage in the protection of TK by formulating rules of either hard law or soft law. The study will preliminarily analyze the legal implications and effect of those instruments. Part II examines the relevance of global lawmaking to TK. Part III reviews the present global legal frameworks dealing with the protection of TK. Then, Part IV assesses the feasibility of establishing a coherent and integrated instrument for TK protection when individual international legal devices are presumed to be of only limited function. Part V presents the conclusion.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF GLOBAL LAWMAKING TO TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: WHY
INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTERS ¶10 As indicated above, TK is developed by local indigenous communities. Management of TK was long a local matter. Yet, in recent years, the protection of TK has become a growing concern in the international community. The achievement of the international endeavor to protect such intellectual and cultural heritage may contribute to the welfare of human kind as a whole.
¶11
Apart from local peoples, TK has also been acquired and employed by foreign entities, including foreign individuals, research academics, and multinational companies. The transnational nature of modern TK use underscores the need to create legal frameworks to regulate such transnational activities not only through national authorities but also through international mechanisms as well. 18 In addition, there has been an international movement to promote and recognize the rights of indigenous peoples who hold most TK. TK protection can be viewed as an imminent international matter, especially from the perspective of international human rights.
19 ¶12 International lawmaking could be conducive to TK protection, if employed effectively. With respect to crafting substantial international rules, relevant international institutions may Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine). See Office of the United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). But, those four objecting nations recently have shifted their position to support the declaration. See U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues website: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/news.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) . 17 These forums have often been noted by legal scholarship. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338-45 (2008); Carvalho, supra note 8; Drahos, supra note 3, at 385-86. Nonetheless, apart from the above-mentioned regimes, there are other U.N. forums that also pay regard to the TK issue, such as the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). See Introduction, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 5. 18 As an aside, note that Professor Jessup's notion of transnational law can be fairly applied to TK regulation. PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) . 19 See infra Part III.D. engage in the negotiations regarding common conditions and standard-setting among States with a view to providing either a minimal or basic level of protection or a strict universally applied requirement. In pursuing the latter option, imposing clear obligations upon contracting parties generates a legally binding force that makes the non-compliance of parties a serious matter. 20 However, States are usually inclined to resist entering into binding agreements that might deprive them of their discretion over protected matters. Accordingly, States may reach compromise by opting instead for a minimum level of protection in the form of relatively weak guidelines or recommendations. 21 In spite of the soft law character of these non-binding agreements, empirical studies have underlined their essential role in the international legal system.
22 ¶13 In order to strengthen protection measures, international institutions have a wide range of options available to them. First, international institutions can formulate enforcement mechanisms to ensure national implementation of treaty obligations and to enforce compliance through rules governing procedure and remedy. For example, the U.N. Security Council is empowered with very strong enforcement authority by which coercive or non-coercive measures may be taken to redress violations. 23 The compliance system operative in the Montreal Protocol, which regulates compliance with environmental regulations, also represents an effective model. dispute settlement mechanism should be established to provide remedies for the breach of obligations. The dispute settlement body of the WTO has been generally considered effective and useful because it adopts compulsory jurisdiction and authorizes sanctions to make effective its adjudications.
26 ¶15 Apart from the lawmaking process, international institutions often also engage in national capacity building by providing technical and financial support and assisting in national implementation of standards. Of course, international cooperation should be mandated or encouraged, such as informational and technical exchanges and technology transfers.
¶16
As mentioned, the use of TK frequently involves transnational actions of foreign entities. It is difficult to deny the limits and probable deficiencies of international regulations on TK; "international law based upon the regulation of state behavior is ill-equipped to respond to corporate behavior, or that of other non-state actors."
28 It is uncertain to what extent the making of TK-related international law may progress, and the effectiveness of these tools also remains to be seen. 29 Yet certainly the ongoing lawmaking process may provide an impetus for the protection, preservation, and development of TK at the international level.
¶17
The following text will examine the present and ongoing lawmaking activities for TK initiated by a variety of international institutions. 33 ¶19 Thus, State Parties' obligations under Article 8(j) include three aspects. First, each Party is required to preserve TK in its territories. Second, the CBD respects the rights of TK holders to the extent that the utilization of TK is not allowed without the approval of TK holders. Third, any contracting Party to the CBD is expected to formulate a system to ensure that TK holders enjoy the benefits that flow from the utilization of their TK. The first element is derived from a conservation perspective. The latter two mandates are designated to oblige Parties to establish suitable legal regimes upon which the application and benefit-sharing of TK can be fairly managed.
III. HOW DO

¶20
Irrespective of CBD's resolve to protect TK and its holders, the normative binding force on Parties seems tenuous. The mandate on States under Article 8(j) is "subject to its national legislation," which may result in multiple interpretations and outcomes. One commentator seems not to worry about the problem of this expression, arguing that the usage "was included in order to protect the existing relationships between some States and their indigenous populations, and should not be interpreted as affording each Contracting Party discretion as whether or not to implement the provision." 34 49 See Programme of Work, supra note 45, at 145-46, Element 3, Task 6, 13, 14, 15 at 145-46 (including the respect, preservation, and maintenance of TK; efforts to strengthen the use of TK; the establishment of national incentive schemes for indigenous peoples to preserve and maintain their TK and for the application of such TK; and the facilitation of repatriation of TK information). ¶26 Thirdly, with respect to regulations to ensure fair TK access, one of the focal points of the programme has been the development of guidelines to ensure the utilization of TK with the consent of the holders and to ensure they can obtain an equitable share of benefits arising from the utilization. 50 To effectively protect such interests, the Article 8(j) Working Group's programme emphasizes prevention measures regarding the misappropriation of TK.
51 ¶27 In practice, many States have adopted specific laws to implement the programme of work on Article 8(j). For instance, Peruvian law requires that people who are interested in having access to the knowledge must apply for the prior informed consent of TK holders. 52 In an effort to document TK, Peruvian law also initiates systems of registration of TK.
53 ¶28 The more recent and prominent progress and achievement of the CBD lawmaking on Article 8(j) are found in the drafting of a text on "elements of a code of ethical conduct," which were finally adopted at COP-10 in 2010. 54 The elements of the code are designed to provide guidance to assist Parties in building their national legal frameworks to fulfill their commitments on respect, preservation, and maintenance of TK.
55 ¶29 The context of the code elaborates and expands the original TK protection mandate enunciated in Article 8(j). The document manages to cover any activities and interactions with indigenous and local communities that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 56 Further, regarding the place where the activities are operative, and considering the integral connection between TK and the environment where they traditionally exist, the code specifies that the geographic coverage of protection may extend to sacred sites, culturally significant sites, and lands and waters in which such activities may occur. 56 See id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 57 Id. ¶ ¶ 3, 17. ¶30 The major part of the code underlines several ethical principles applicable to the activities and interactions in questions. Some of them tend to confirm the privileges of indigenous peoples, although the passage carefully avoids using terms that indicate group rights. The privileges consist of claims on intellectual property relevant to TK, the right to know (keeping the operation of the activities transparency), the right to give prior informed consent, and the right to claim benefit-sharing. 58 As the term 'rights' has yet to be clearly specified in Article 8(j), 59 other principles underline the burdens imposed on entities engaging in relevant activities, without producing concrete commitments regarding TK protection.
60 ¶31 More importantly, apart from delivering general ethical principles, the code also provides 'specific consideration,' which arguably incorporates human rights aspects under the rubric of TK protection. The approach clearly indicates the attempt to link TK protection to certain indigenous peoples' human rights which have already been promoted by other instruments of international human rights, 61 such as recognition of rights to lands and waters occupied or used by indigenous peoples, rights to traditional resources, and the right not to be removed.
62 ¶32 Indeed, the code emphasizes that it "should not be construed as altering or interpreting the obligations of Parties to the Convention . . ."
63 Such inclusion appears to be an indication of minimizing the legal effect of the document. Nevertheless, when viewing the document as a whole, its elaboration and amplification of the original mandate of TK protection specified in the wording of Article 8(j) is simply in line with the usual model developed in the lawmaking process of multilateral treaties. One of the objectives of the CBD aims to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of biodiversity resources, 65 especially genetic resources. 66 The goal reflects grave concerns over the protection of genetic resource-providing countries from the unauthorized, uncompensated activities of bioprospectors, particularly bio-piracy. 67 75 Id. ¶ 16(b)(ii).
jurisdiction, "could" consider adopting measures to encourage the disclosure of the origin of TK while applying for intellectual property rights. 76 In accessing biodiversity-related TK, the prior informed consent of TK holders should be obtained in accordance with their traditional practices, national access policies, and subject to domestic laws. 77 With regards to the mutually agreed upon terms between users and providers, the Guidelines provide an indicative list of typical terms, including "whether relevant TK has been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has been protected and encouraged."
78 ¶37 The practice of some developing countries hosting TK has been consistent with the Bonn Guidelines. In Brazil, applicants for intellectual property rights must disclose the origin of the genetic material and the associated traditional knowledge.
79 This is distinct from the Peruvian practice regarding the requirement of prior informed consent mentioned above.
¶38
Although the informative and detailed Guidelines have contributed greatly to the field, the instrument remains a voluntary commitment, rather than a binding obligation. 80 In effect, the Guidelines give Parties much discretion in managing access to genetic resource-associated TK without undertaking real international obligations.
ii both to genetic resources and associated TK. The draft clearly seeks to enforce the interests of TK holders.
¶40
In effect, the 2006 draft proposes to contain measures to ensure compliance with the prior informed consent of TK holders. 84 The inclusion of measures to prevent misappropriation and unauthorized access and use of TK is also under deliberation. 85 The draft further requires that
Parties take enforcement measures, such as sanctions, to prevent uses of TK that fail to comply with provisions of the international regime.
86 ¶41 At its ninth meeting in 2008, the COP adopted a more detailed agenda on the negotiations of the international regime. 87 Regarding the protection of TK in the context of the ABS system, the agenda provides components to be negotiated, which fulfill and elaborate the mandate of ABS disclosed in Article 8(j). However, it should be noted that Article 8(j) actually does not use identical terms as those in Article 15 of the CBD. 88 To expand and apply the ABS regime originating in Article 15 to cover TK protection requires further study and political will. In order to assist the ABS Working Group, the COP decided to establish a group of technical and legal experts on genetic resource-related TK to study and examine relevant issues, such as the definition of associated TK, the applicability of ABS in Article 15 to TK and the legal basis of prior informed consent for TK holders.
89 ¶42 The result of the seventh meeting of the Working Group on ABS reveals more specific elements on TK's ABS device, 90 which elaborates and amplifies Article 8(j) and the Bonn Guidelines in this regard. It manages to define clearly the rights and obligations of both TK holders and national authorities. The draft tends to promote the status of indigenous and local communities with regard to TK access by confirming their right to be consulted by authorities, including on the matters of prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms in benefit-sharing, and effective participation. 91 To allow them to actively and meaningfully engage, Parties hosting TK are required to provide capacity building, to ensure appropriate participation, and to provide assistance in giving prior informed consent and forming mutually agreed terms.
92 ¶43 At the eighth meeting of the Working Group on ABS, under the insistence and advocacy of genetic resource-rich countries, an agenda to negotiate a binding protocol for the international regime prevailed. 93 Meanwhile, more draft texts to uphold the rights of TK holders in ABS continued to be produced.
94 ¶44 At the last ABS working group meeting prior to the COP-10, a revised draft protocol on ABS was then formulated in the form of a treaty. 95 The draft largely reflects the genuine expectations of indigenous and local communities by requiring TK hosting Parties to grant TK holders the right to prior informed consent and benefit-sharing while genetic resource-related TK is accessed and utilized. 96 Parties' obligation to support capacity building for TK holders has also been confirmed. 97 However, some phrases are still subject to deliberation and final approval.
Moreover, Parties' obligations, such as those concerning TK access, are to some extent also weakened by the addition of compromising language, such as "with the aim of" and "as appropriate."
98 ¶45 At its tenth meeting, held in Japan in October 2011, the COP eventually adopted the Nagoya Protocol on ABS 99 to finalize the six years of negotiation for creating an international ABS regime. Most elements concerning TK that were negotiated in the previous drafts have been reflected in the Protocol. As such, the treaty seems to oblige both TK hosting and user countries to ensure that TK holders' rights to benefit-sharing and prior informed consent are enforced. However, the obligatory level of certain items remains deferential. The Nagoya Protocol will remain open for signature by Parties to the Convention from February 2, 2011 until February 1, 2012, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Because the Protocol is still in the signature stage, it remains to be seen how many countries ultimately ratify the protocol and what effect it will have on international TK protection. What is clear is that, without changes in domestic law, the Protocol has not yet established a strong mandate to require Parties to observe ABS elements for TK holders below the international level.
Reflection and Comments on the CBD's Progress ¶47
Presently, it may be safe to say that the CBD is the most dynamic international legal system for promoting the protection of TK, although its mandate is confined to the context of biodiversity-related areas. In effect, the regime constitutes one of the most significant international institutions that pay due regard to TK holders. While no precise and definite obligations of Parties are specified in Article 8(j) of the CBD in terms of TK preservation, it remains to be seen how nations may seriously implement Article 8(j) in its broader sense. Nonetheless, while recognizing the indispensable role of TK holders in the fulfillment of the mandate of Article 8(j), the CBD's continuous efforts to make indigenous peoples and local communities involved in relevant lawmaking and deliberation processes cannot be underestimated.
¶48
The CBD has finished a preliminary study and survey on the status of TK and proposed certain means for its preservation, such as documentation of TK. Currently, at least one soft law character of guidance in assisting implementation has been formulated and adopted.
103 ¶49 Indeed, the current work of guidelines and principles is not of a binding nature, but is instead voluntary. Nonetheless, as observed, some international soft law instruments do go beyond the status of a simply non-binding force and may be transformed into binding form while having dynamic interaction with related treaty regimes. 104 It would thus be premature to predict how far the Working Group's efforts on Article 8(j) may go in terms of influencing national TK policy. However, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, some developing countries have already begun implementing such instruments.
¶50
The attempt to formulate a code of ethical conduct is an indication of the CBD's broader perspective on TK protection, which is not limited to the knowledge itself, but manages to extend to the geographic and ecological environment where TK originates and develops. The move should be justifiable and desirable given the close and inalienable linkage between them. In particular, the incorporation of a human rights approach for TK protection could further the legal status of TK holders and safeguard TK from undesirable activities. Thus, in contrast to some observations, 105 the progress of TK working groups has actually moved towards the clarification of the rights of TK holders, in spite of its voluntary nature.
¶51
Apart from calling for the submission of national reports regarding Parties' implementation, the CBD on Article 8(j) makes little progress with respect to monitoring mechanisms. Given the weak commitments imposed on Parties in this regard, at the current stage it would be politically infeasible to incorporate any compliance mechanism from the perspective of TK preservation into the CBD framework. Nevertheless, despite lacking real teeth, the CBD COP/Working Group on Article 8(j) can regularly keep Parties informed of the significance of TK protection by signaling international concern at all levels of the CBD forums.
¶52
On the other hand, relatively visible progress has been made concerning the ABS mechanism that has covered bio-related TK, evidenced in the Bonn Guidelines and the newly adopted Nagoya Protocol on ABS. As indicated above, the soft law character of the Bonn Guidelines may weaken their effectiveness. Attempts to establish an ABS treaty regime do demonstrate the CBD's resolve to enforce one of its objectives on a global basis. In terms of obliging Parties to protect TK in the context of ABS, the eventual establishment of the Nagoya Protocol may be a repetition of an episode on how a soft approach of the Bonn Guidelines can be transformed into a more consolidated form. 106 The new treaty does expand the realm of ABS to include TK protection. As indicated above, however, the Parties' commitment on international level remains uncertain due to the wide margin of national discretion. Thus, in spite of its legally binding form, it remains to be observed whether and to what extent the newly developed ABS treaty regime, in the form of the Nagoya Protocol, may make substantial contribution to TK enforcement after its inception.
107
105 Some scholars are not convinced that presently "the COP will provide the vehicle for further clarification of indigenous and local communities' rights." BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 20, at 628. 106 For instance, the binding form of non-compliance procedure set in the Montreal Protocol is preceded by a nonbinding resolution. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 22, at 218. 107 According to Art. 30 of the Nagoya Protocol, the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol would adopt procedures and mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 99, art. 30. ¶53 Furthermore, irrespective of its non-intellectual property rights treaty nature, the CBD appears to call on other intellectual property rights-related international institutions, such as the WIPO and WTO, to pay due regard to the protection of biodiversity-related TK in terms of property rights. 108 Particularly in light of this push for multilateral approaches to TK protection, the CBD has become pivotal in initiating and promoting TK protection amongst relevant international legal regimes.
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization
1. Background ¶54 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a subsidiary organ of the United Nations that supervises global intellectual property treaties, appears to be relatively attentive to the grave concern of the CBD regarding the impact of intellectual property rights on the implementation of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) system. At its sixth meeting, the COP to the CBD in 2002 adopted a decision on the "Role of intellectual property rights in the implementation of access and benefit-sharing arrangements."
109 With respect to the issue of TK protection, Parties are invited to encourage the disclosure of the origin of bio-related TK. The COP has signaled that TK-related intellectual property rights fall under the competence of other international institutions, such as the WIPO. It thus invited WIPO to prepare a technical study on disclosure requirements of associated TK and its sources, where they are utilized in the development of the claimed inventions. 110 The WIPO was also encouraged Parties to consider means by which they could collaborate to protect TK.
111 ¶55 In 2000, in response to the increasing global concern over the impact of intellectual property rights on the protection of genetic resources, TK, and traditional cultural expressions, WIPO established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC). Since then, especially with the CBD's urging, the IGC has been conducting a substantial and comprehensive study on the legal and policy options for the protection of TK. 112 The task involves "analyses of existing national and applicants to disclose the country of origin of TK, as well as the evidence of compliance with prior informed consent and benefit-sharing arrangements required by the country of origin.
121 ¶58 General Guiding Principles are designed to "ensure that the substantive provisions concerning protection are equitable, balanced, effective and consistent, and appropriately promote the objectives of protection." 122 ¶59 Several Guiding Principles do invoke a mandate to address the needs and rights of TK holders.
123 Also, certain elements of ABS have been confirmed as part of the Principles. 124 The inclusion of the ABS elements simply reflects the harmonization with the CBD mandate that confers national authority to regulate the matter in this regard. 125 In particular, the Principles declare that the rights of TK holders should be recognized and respected. While the CBD has not yet endorsed the "rights" of TK holders, the WIPO's design represents remarkable progress in this direction. Nevertheless, according to the commentary on the Principles, such rights would not be on a comprehensive basis. Rather, the rights seem to be narrowed to a defensive nature, which are applied only to the protection against misappropriation. 126 The principle of recognizing the specific characteristics of TK (traditional, collective or communal, inter-generational and constantly evolving) is specified. 127 The capacity building for TK holders is of grave concern to the WIPO task.
128
ii) Legal Framework
¶60
Arguably the most important contribution of the draft to TK protection is the formation of a set of substantive provisions that are largely legal in nature. The draft provisions consist of fourteen articles that constitute a systematic legal framework for the protection of TK.
¶61
As mentioned, it is not the intention of the IGC to adopt a positive-rights approach toward TK protection. Thus, no exclusive or monopolistic property rights are created for TK. 129 Article 1 explicitly declares that the protection is limited to rights against misappropriation or misuse.
Respecting existing national legal systems concerning TK protection, Article 2 gives nations much discretion and flexibility regarding the legal form of protection.
130
121 Id. at 4-5. 122 Id. at 8. 123 Id. 124 Id. 125 Id. at 10-11. 126 Id. at 9. See also the discussion of Peruvian legislation, infra note 147 and accompanying text, for an example of how prior informed consent and benefit sharing should be implemented to prevent misappropriation. 127 Id. at 11. 128 Id. 129 Id. at 14. 130 Id. at 17. ¶62 Articles 3 to 5 tend to clarify the realm of both TK and its holders. Given the diverse definitions and scope of TK in national legal systems, Article 3, titled "General Scope of Subject Matter," "does not seek to apply one singular and exhaustive definition" of TK. 131 Rather, it simply underlines a general description and then an illustrative list of elements within the scope of TK. 132 "Eligibility for the protection," specified in Article 4, manages to propose what qualities TK should have, mainly: (i) a traditional, intergenerational character; (ii) a distinctive association with its traditional holders; and (iii) a sense of linkage with the identity of the TK holding community. 133 Article 5 defines which TK holders are entitled to such protection. The beneficiaries comprise the indigenous and traditional communities that generate, preserve and transmit the knowledge, or individuals within these communities and peoples.
134 ¶63 Articles 6 and 7 incorporate the mandate of ABS that has been adopted and implemented within the CBD and many national regimes. 135 Article 8 provides exceptions and limitations to the TK protection with a view to reconciling with public interests and policy. 136 In contrast to general intellectual property rights setting the duration of protection, Article 9 considers TK protection should last as long as the TK meets the criteria of eligibility for protection defined in Article 4. 137 Article 10 deals with transitional measures, which give fair treatment to third parties who acquired TK in good faith before the implementation of the protection measures.
138
According to Article 11, the formalities of protection are not required. Countries are allowed to maintain a system of TK registers. Yet, the system should not prejudice undisclosed TK or the interests of TK holders. 139 Article 12, titled "Consistency with the General Legal Framework,"
requires that access to bio-diversity related knowledge be consistent with national laws governing the matter.
140 ¶64 Article 13 mainly provides the content of competency for each national authority in order to assist the administration and enforcement of such protection. 141 The provision also mandates that enforcement mechanisms "should be fair and equitable, [and] should be accessible [,] [a]ppropriate and not burdensome for holders of traditional knowledge, and should provide safeguards for legitimate third party interest and the public interest." 142 131 Id. at 20. 132 Id. 133 Id. at 22-23. 134 Id. at 24. 135 Id. at 27-32. 136 Id. at 33-34. 137 Id. at 35-36. 138 Id. at 37-38. 139 Id. at 39-40. 140 Id. at 41-42. 141 Id. at 44-45. 142 Id. at 44. ¶65 In terms of the status of national TK holders in foreign countries, Article 14 on international and regional protection adopts the principle of national treatment. Consequently, foreign TK holders enjoy no fewer benefits than those who are nationals of the country offering protection. 143 3. An Assessment of the WIPO Task ¶66 It may be fair to contend that the current WIPO/IGC draft is the most systematic international instrument for TK protection, at least in terms of IP protection. It not only provides lofty objectives and principles, but also a definite and well-structured legal foundation. If widely accepted and implemented, it would to a certain degree promote TK protection on a global basis and advance the rights and interests of TK holders as well. Not surprisingly, the WIPO has been considered to be the appropriate forum for formulating relevant rules on TK protection.
¶67
Although the IGC work has not yet been finalized, the influence of the draft over international legislative progress cannot be underestimated. Indeed, several regional and national processes have availed themselves of the draft WIPO provisions in developing and designing their TK protection measures.
¶68
In spite of the above accomplishment, it should be noted that the TK protection provided by the draft instrument is a defensive mechanism in that it only applies to action against misappropriation of TK.
146 With respect to national practice, the Peruvian legislation represents the leading practice of allowing TK holders, inter alia, to enjoy the right of protection against unauthorized use, which echoes the WIPO's approach.
147 ¶69 Further, certain deficiencies embodied in the WIPO work are evident. These provisions, irrespective of WIPO's well-organized structure, fall short of crystalline obligations upon States given that the WIPO avoids using the term "shall" as much as possible. 148 As a result, no definite and strong commitments are established for States, and they still can maintain extensive discretion and latitude in regulating TK protection. More importantly, the final form and status of 148 The term 'shall' is rarely applied. Arts. 1 and 9(2) are the only two instances; the wording 'should' or 'may' is frequently used instead.
the document has not yet been settled. 149 It is observed that most WIPO members, either developed or developing nations, now lack strong political will and momentum to take the task in a serious manner. 150 Accordingly, there is a high possibility that the instrument may turn out to be similar to the voluntary Bonn Guidelines.
¶70
Of course, the IGC will continue to seek international consensus on TK protection with a view to setting up a minimum standard. Even if the text may result in a binding instrument, the inherent flaw of the WIPO that weakens its effectiveness, is the lack of a decent enforcement mechanism. Since then, the WTO has acquired parallel competence over intellectual property rights protection, irrespective of the existence of the WIPO.
¶72
The present TRIPS context does not cover TK protection. 153 TK draws the attention of the WTO as a result of the CBD's call for relevant international organizations, including the WTO, to be aware about the impact of intellectual property rights policy on access and benefit-sharing of genetic resources and associated knowledge. 154 Developing countries have especially sensed the gravity of the piracy and misappropriation of bio-diversity related TK, mostly occurring in their territories. 155 Since 1999, the TRIPS Council has accordingly begun to debate and review the interrelationship between the TRIPS and the CBD. 158 Initially there had been different views on whether the WTO is the right forum for TK negotiations. Developed countries had insisted that the WIPO/IGC is the more suitable forum. In contrast, developing countries support the protection of TK through negotiations at the WTO, partly due to the insufficient enforcement power of the WIPO. 159 Currently, however, the WTO has made no progress on positive TK protection.
160 ¶74 TK protection, however, has been negotiated under the context of the TRIPS-CBD relationship since 2002. The central deliberations in the TRIPS Council have focused on the proposals of many bio-resource-rich developing countries regarding the disclosure of origin, which has also been a focal debate at the CBD and WIPO.161 They appeal the revision of the TRIPS Agreement to add further disclosure obligations. The proposed amendment requires that patent applicants shall provide, as a condition to acquiring patent rights, the following evidence:
! (i) disclosure of the source and country of origin of the biological resource and of the traditional knowledge used in the invention; ! (ii) evidence of prior informed consent through approval of authorities under the relevant national regime; and ! (iii) evidence of fair and equitable benefit-sharing under the relevant national regime. 162 Developing countries contend that the disclosure requirements, if made mandatory, would be useful to deter the undesirable grant of patents for inventions that misappropriate or illicitly acquire bio-resources or associated TK. 163 Further, such revision aims to ensure that TRIPS is implemented in a manner supportive of the CBD objectives.
164 ¶75 Nonetheless, the proposal has met the strong opposition of some developed members. For example, the U.S. consistently objects to the amendment. The U.S. argues that the requirement would create an unnecessary burden upon national patent authorities, 165 and that the more effective means to curb bio-piracy is through solid enforcement of national ABS laws and contract arrangements. 166 Switzerland, although sympathetic to the concern raised by developing countries, proposes the amendment of the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty as an alternative.
167 ¶76 Since the release of the disclosure proposal, both groups have been engaging in a very heated debate. 168 Given the significant controversy of the amendment and the persistent opposition by developed world, especially the U.S., there seems to be no sign that the stalemate will be solved in the near future or that the disclosure revision will reach consensus among WTO members. 169 In order to reach a compromise, Ni suggests that such a disclosure requirement could be of a discretional instead of compulsory nature for WTO members. In effect, the discretion allows nations to decide whether patent applicants are required to submit necessary information in this regard. While many developing countries have linked the grant of patents to the compliance with their ABS laws, this approach ensures the consistency of such national laws with TRIPS. Ni, supra note 15, at 457-58. ¶77 If the developing countries' proposal succeeds, the amendment would become obligatory upon each WTO member, and national relevant IP laws must be revised accordingly. The implementation of the mandate would be under the supervision of the TRIPS Council. The noncompliance of the presumed obligations would be subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism that provides a relatively effective procedure. 170 Were such an amendment to pass, TRIPS would mandate compulsory disclosure of TK origin and it would allow TK-hostingcountries who are WTO members to sue countries like the U.S. (also a WTO member) if U.S. agents (such as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) fail to require intellectual property rights applicants to disclose the information. This would be a dispute between WTO members instead of between indigenous groups and States. Of course, the local groups may pressure their hosting countries to resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, not surprisingly, developing countries are convinced that the WTO is the appropriate forum to effectively solve the problem of the misappropriation of bioresources and related knowledge.
D. The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: 171 The Protection of TK Holders from a Human Rights Perspective ¶78 Most TK holders are from indigenous communities. As TK holders constitute the most important stakeholder in the context of TK protection, their TK rights should be fairly protected and recognized. ¶79 The promotion and recognition of indigenous peoples' rights have become important international issues. In addition to the efforts of the International Labor Organization (ILO), 172 the U.N., during the past several decades, has engaged in lawmaking to protect the rights of indigenous peoples in many fora. For example, the discussion of issues pertaining to indigenous peoples was initiated by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities under the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. However, a serious deliberation of protecting indigenous peoples' rights had not taken place until the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, a sub-organ under the Sub-Commission, in 1982. 173 
¶80
The mandate of the Working Group aims to: (i) annually review recent developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, and (ii) develop international standards regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples. 174 Following a resolution of the Sub-Commission stating that a special instrument, in the form of a declaration, was needed, the Working Group first formulated certain generally agreed-upon principles. Over time, it eventually completed the draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993.
175 ¶81 In accordance with a resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, 176 184 Furthermore, the declaration demands that States, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures to recognize and protect the exercise of the rights listed in the declaration. 185 In contrast to previous international instruments concerning the duty of States regarding TK protection, this provision seems to send a relatively strong message to States hosting indigenous peoples.
¶84
This instrument also declares certain rights that are relevant to the preservation of TK as a whole. Article 25 recognizes the distinct relationship between indigenous peoples and their traditionally owned or occupied lands, territories, and resources. 186 Additionally, their right to own, use, develop, and control these areas has been affirmed. 187 Article 29 bestows upon indigenous peoples the right to conserve and protect the environment. 188 As mentioned above, these rights to some extent have been incorporated into the current CBD lawmaking process in Article 8(j).
189 ¶85 The declaration, irrespective of its adoption and possible influence, is not legally binding. But, multilateral declarations are able to generate a variety of lawmaking effects, which can be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 190 It has been observed that the degree of support for a declaration matters. 191 In effect, a consensus declaration or a unanimous adoption amounts to a sign of strong expectations of compliance. 192 It is worth noting that the Declaration tends to strengthen its implementation and effectiveness by requesting the U.N. system, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), 196 and States to promote respect for and full application of the content of the Declaration. 197 Literally speaking, the UNPFII would be competent to monitor and supervise the progress and compliance of the Declaration. 198 It remains to be seen how far and to what extent each nation would implement the U.N. mandate, and how seriously the U.N. regime may ensure the effectiveness and observance of the rules.
IV. DO WE NEED A SINGLE FORUM TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE? ¶88 The above study indicates the active and diverse global lawmaking on TK. The development of course will continue to evolve and progress. The proliferation of international TK lawmaking reflects the broad spectrum of TK, including, inter alia, the concern of nature conservation, cultural expression, intellectual property and the protection and recognition of indigenous peoples' rights. Usually a multilateral lawmaking process on the same subject matter may generate incoherent or even conflicting normative implications. Drahos points out that multiple international efforts to protect TK and the application of a variety of norms to TK protections that are already being enacted at state level would make TK regulations lose coherence and produce a clash of cultures, legal approaches, and enforcement strategies. 199 In order to avoid such circumstances, the international community should promote harmony and coherence amongst the regimes at stake.
¶89
The CBD appears to be the most dynamic global institution on the protection of TK. The CBD currently focuses on building an ABS international regime that would cover the enforcement of genetic resource-associated TK. The newly adopted Nagoya Protocol reflects the determination of the CBD Parties to eliminate bio-piracy and misappropriation of such genetic resources and associated knowledge. Overall, the lawmaking has been an international movement to consolidate and enhance the efforts in combating the illegal monopoly of such items, and to ensure that genetic resources and TK holders may benefit from the commercialization of these valuable objects. In spite of the promising effort, the CBD arrangement has its own limitations. The CBD, by its mandate, cannot govern the protection of TK beyond the bio-diversity related sphere and accordingly lacks expertise and competence to effectively address TK-related intellectual property rights. Without the cooperation of the U.S. (which has long been blamed for bio-related piracy) especially, the future international regime on ABS hardly can thoroughly redress the violation of provider parties' national law concerning the preservation of bio-related TK. Because the U.S. is not a party to the CBD, the treaty body would be incapable of monitoring the U.S. patent policy concerning TK. ¶90 The property and commercial orientation of the WIPO and WTO probably make them insufficient instruments in terms of governing TK protection. Also, it remains uncertain whether the U.N. Indigenous Forum can effectively supervise and enforce its TK mandate. ¶91 Indeed, TK is not the only cross-cutting issue facing the international community. For instance, as noted by Boyle and Chinkin, there have been a variety of U.N. bodies governing the development of forest-related rules, 200 and "no single forum is self-evidently the right one to undertake the development of new laws." 201 Given the limitation embodied in the present TK lawmaking regimes, similar to the forest scenario, no single forum currently proves to be available and competent to manage TK thoroughly. ¶92 Ideally, the international community needs a coherent and integrated instrument or institution on TK to formulate binding rules and effective enforcement mechanisms. The diverse merits of TK make it difficult to decide which single international institution or treaty body, and in what form, should govern the matter. Drahos proposes the establishment of a Global BioCollecting Society (GBS) regime to co-ordinate multiple international institutions, and argues the agenda of enforcement should be placed as the first priority. 202 Yet, the question remains unsettled as to which international institution should be in charge of the matter.
¶93
Constructing a single institution on TK lawmaking would likely not be realistic in the near future. Nevertheless, in light of the lawmaking process of those institutions mentioned above, it is worth noting that, the U.N.-related institutions (CBD, WIPO, and U.N. Human Rights' mechanisms) to some extent have already been engaging in harmonization of lawmaking activities. Not only do they have cross-culture dialogue 203 and cooperation, 204 but they are also seeking mutual incorporation and integration in the TK context (see Figure 1 below for a graphic representation of this concept). The constant sharing of common values could alleviate the adverse effect of fragmentation of international TK lawmaking and help promote coherence among these regimes. Certainly, trans-institutional cooperation and mutual supportiveness for TK protection among the relevant international TK instruments will be essential as the respective TK instruments become operative and mature in the future. The protection of TK is no longer a matter of national context. Rather, there has been a growing international movement to structure TK in a more normative form. Of course, the lawmaking process of relevant international legal regimes is still ongoing. Presently, it remains premature to predict the eventual outcome. Given the largely soft law character of most international instruments on TK, it seems far from clear whether States may seriously conform to the rules. The effect of those "laws" may be even less prominent, especially when a powerful mechanism to supervise or monitor the national enforcement of TK mandates is still scant. Yet, the adoption of a binding ABS by the CBD may make things different. ¶96 The uncertain international legal status of those TK holders, mainly indigenous peoples, would leave the protection of TK to the discretion of each State. Indeed, the ABS Protocol of the CBD, if run successfully, would uphold the protection of biodiversity-related TK and preserve the interest of indigenous and local groups holding such TK. Its effectiveness is nevertheless confined to matters of ABS regarding associated TK. ¶97 The significance of the WIPO document on TK protection cannot be overemphasized. The work can be deemed as international consensus to protect TK from the perspective of a defensive approach. However, as indicated, it would not be possible to make the document legally binding, partly because the expressions used in the draft have indicated that it may turn out to be a form of voluntary guidelines.
¶98
The WTO agreements, including the TRIPS, are the most mandatory of the current international regimes. Their enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms are also relatively effective. The current Doha Round Negotiations, however, do not create a particular agenda for TK protection. There has also been strong resistance against the approach to add the CBD elements into the disclosure requirement for patent applications. It is thus highly unlikely that the WTO may actively contribute to the protection of TK at the present stage. ¶99
Most of current TK lawmaking remains in a preliminary stage and the proposed documents are largely of soft law character. However, their draft form and non-binding nature, such as the WIPO and U.N. instruments, do not prevent them from providing useful reference for national TK legislation. It is also predictable that the elaboration and finalization of these TK instruments may help promote and enhance the awareness and political will to engage in domestic TK lawand policy-making. It may thus be premature to cast a definite judgment on the achievement of the current international lawmaking on TK. Whether the movement would be a useful vehicle or just an empty box awaits further assessment. ¶100
On the other hand, the proliferation of global TK lawmaking reveals a potential contradiction amongst relevant international norms. To enhance mutual supportiveness and to avoid conflict, it is highly desirable to articulate a mechanism to harmonize and reconcile those lawmaking vehicles. While the formation of a single comprehensive international institution for the development of TK law probably remains remote or unrealistic, the present and continuous harmonization among TK lawmaking mechanisms proves to be essential and must be strengthened. 
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